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Abstract This paper describes the different components of mass-migration-related fear based on the 
theoretical framework of integrated threat theory developed by Stephan et al. (1999) and reveals the 
social basis of fear in relation to the recent migration crisis that has been affecting Europe since 2015. 
The paper uses survey data from the research entitled The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in 
Hungary implemented in 2016 by TÁRKI Social Research Institute. Results show that the majority of 
respondents worried a lot about both the realistic and the symbolic threat of migration (around 60% of 
respondents perceive intense migration related threats). We identified only a small subsample of people 
who worried more about the realistic than the symbolic threat of mass migration (15% of respondents), 
and only a tiny subsample of respondents who worried more about the symbolic than realistic the threat 
of mass migration. Regarding the socio-demographic predictors, respondents’ age as well as their place 
of residence played important roles in the perception of threat, but not exactly in the same way as in case 
of xenophobic attitudes. On the other hand, respondents’ level of educational and political activity did 
not predict perceptions of threat, in contrast to our hypothesis based on the literature about predictors 
of xenophobia. In addition, personal contact with migrants, social trust, political activity and affiliation 
are also directly associated with the perceived threat towards mass migration, both in the European and 
the national context. 
Keywords: anti-immigrant sentiments, fear, integrated threat, asylum seekers
Introduction and contextual background
Intergroup relations between the majority population and immigrant minorities 
are inevitably a hot issue in the European context. Based on a very recent survey on 
xenophobic attitudes– carried out by TÁRKI–in October 2016 the level of xenophobia 
had reached an all-time high (58% of the total population), and xenophilia had 
practically disappeared in Hungary since January 2016 (INDEX 2016). Most European 
countries are experiencing some kind of social change brought about by international 
migration, and are faced with the serious challenge of integrating first-, second- 
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and third-generation migrants. Moreover, the migration crisis of recent years has 
increasingly affected Europe, raising further policy questions and provoking security 
dilemmas related to the integration of third-country national migrants and refugees. 
The Hungarian context is distinct from that of most other European countries which 
have experienced huge migration flows in the past years, both in terms of the political 
context (the government’s extreme anti-immigration politics) and in terms of the 
radical change in the volume of migration in 2015. Since the legal and physical closure 
of the borders in autumn 2015,1 hardly any asylum seekers have entered Hungary (as 
opposed to the period from 1 April - 15 September 2015 when at least 170 thousand 
migrants and asylum seekers crossed the Hungarian borders2).
As far as the political context is concerned, the official communication of the 
Hungarian government refrained purposefully from using the words ‘asylum-
seekers’ and ‘refugees’, and preferred to use the terms ‘illegal migrants’ and ‘economic 
migrants’ during the 2015 crisis in order to frame public discourse. In opposition 
to this, certain left-wing political parties, as well as certain research institutes (e.g. 
Publicus Research), intentionally used the term ‘asylum-seekers’ and ‘refugees’ for this 
heterogeneous group of people to frame the public discourse the other way around. 
Even though we avoid a thorough discussion of the political context and focus on 
the social aspects of the migration crisis in this paper, in order to better understand 
xenophobic attitudes and migration-related fear in Hungary the concept of moral 
panic is briefly described here. The original concept was developed by Cohen in 
the early 1970s; for the Hungarian application and contextual background, see, for 
example, Kitzinger (2000). Moral panic is the process of arousing social concern over 
an issue, usually through the work of moral entrepreneurs (i.e. the one initiating 
the panic creates a clear message and sets the agenda) and the mass media. This 
process can be described as intensive fear and a high level of anxiety raised by news 
transmitted by the mass media that is responded to by governmental measures; 
therefore it has a special relevance to our subject matter. Well-known scholars 
(Róna-Tas, Á. 2016 and Erős, F. 2016) have used this term recently in Hungarian 
public discourse to contextualise the social effects of the migration crisis which 
started in 2015. Both Erős and Róna-Tas argued that moral panic was stoked by the 
Hungarian government, relying on strong national feelings, xenophobic attitudes 
closely related to welfare chauvinism, and scapegoating. 
To sum up, there has been increasing public and scientific attention to the 
different aspects of the migration crisis that has affected Europe since 2015. On the 
media discourse, see Bernáth-Messing (2015); for the public polls and surveys, see 
the recent results of Publicus (2016), Századvég (2016) and TÁRKI (2016), and for 
relevant literature using survey experiments, see Bognár and Janky (2016). In this 
1 16 October 2015.
2 “After Hungary completed a fence on its border with Serbia in September, the flow of migrants shifted to Croatia. In all of 2015, 
the region recorded 764 000 detections, a 16-fold rise from 2014. The top-ranking nationality was Syrian, followed by Iraqis and 
Afghans.” Source: FRONTEX http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/western-balkan-route/
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paper3 we aim to assess different components of mass-migration related fear based 
on the theoretical framework of integrated threat theory developed by Stephan et 
al. (1993 and 1999) and to reveal the social basis of fear in relation to the recent 
migration crisis that has affected Europe since the beginning of 2015. 
This paper is structured in the following way: the first chapter presents the 
theoretical framework and aims to introduce the concepts of integrated threat 
theory; chapter two reviews the most relevant research that has been done in this 
field. This is followed by the formulation of the hypotheses in chapter 3 and a 
short methodological note about the survey instrument and the specific questions 
used in our analysis (chapter 4). Results are presented in chapter 5. Finally, in the 
conclusions we reflect on the most relevant findings from the data analysis and the 
limitations of our research (chapter 6).
The theoretical and conceptual framework
the integrated threat theory (originally developed by Stephan and Stephan 1993 and 
1996) is a widely used theoretical framework to examine anti-immigrant sentiments 
in European societies (see for example Velasco-Gonzalez et al., 2008) as well as in 
the USA (see for example Croucher et al., 2013) The theory –incorporating several 
theoretical perspectives on stereotypes and prejudices– suggests that four basic 
types of perceived threat may lead to prejudice. 
(i) Realistic threats can be understood at the material, economic and political level, 
and the focus is on the competition over material and economic group interests. This 
concept is closely related to the idea welfare-chauvinism, as both concepts focusing on 
the perceived competition of the scarce resources (such as labour market positions and 
social services) and the majority’s perception is that these resources are threatened by 
outsiders, e.g. immigrants. (ii) Symbolic threats are based on perceived group differences 
in values, norms, and beliefs (Stephan and Stephan, 1993). The basis of this perception 
is that out-groups (e.g. immigrants) often have differing worldviews than dominant 
groups. (iii) Negative stereotyping are expectations of how a member of an out-group will 
behave and often related to feelings of threat and fear. (Verkuyten, 1997). The fourth 
type is (iv) intergroup anxiety that is a feeling of being personally threatened during 
interactions with out-group members. An important difference between threats and 
negative stereotyping on the one hand and intergroup anxiety on the other, is that the 
former three are mostly understood at the group level, while the later one is primarily 
understood at the individual level. A limitation of our analysis that the used data did 
not contain specific questions either on stereotypes, or on intergroup anxiety, or on 
prejudices, therefore our analysis is only focusing on the identification of the social 
3 Here I want to thank Professor Joseph P. Forgas for consulting with us during the formulation of hypotheses and operationalising 
the specific questions, as well as Professor Endre Sik for helping me to structure the analytical framework. I also want to thank 
for the important remarks gained from the Editorial Board of the Review of Sociology and from the peer reviewers of my 
manuscript.
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basis of the realistic and symbolic threats perceived at the individual level. Scapegoating 
and welfare chauvinism are also central elements of anti-immigrant sentiment, as well 
as being closely related to migration-related threats. Welfare chauvinism refers to the 
idea that welfare benefits should be restricted to certain groups, particularly to the 
natives of a country, as opposed to immigrants.4 The idea that ‘welfare services should 
be restricted to our own’ has had a great impact on public opinion and on asylum 
policy as well (for earlier research on that in the Hungarian context see for example 
Enyedi, Fábián and Sik, 2004). As a part of the current research, in October 2015 a 
set of items was developed to measure the different elements of fear in four Central 
Eastern countries, as well as the perception that immigrants, asylum seekers, and 
refugees pose a serious danger to the country’s welfare system. Migration-related fear 
and scapegoating was found to be at very high level in Hungary, as well as in countries 
neighbouring Hungary, despite the low proportion of migrants in these countries 
compared to those of Western Europe. Focusing on migration-related cultural and 
realistic fears (certain forms of welfare chauvinism), the two extreme cases in this 
regard are, interestingly, Slovakia and the Czech Republic (among the four Visegrad 
countries), the two countries that have not been affected by the recent migration crisis 
at all (Bernát et al. 2015).
Previous relevant research in the field
Previous research has confirmed both in the European (see Bizman and Yinon, 2001; 
Gonzàlez et al., 2008; Stephan and Stephan, 1993, 1996) and in the US context 
(Croucher et al., 2013) that Muslim immigrants are perceived both as a realistic and 
as a symbolic threat to the dominant–mostly Christian–Western cultures. Moreover, 
realistic and symbolic threats from immigrant groups are not only closely related 
to each other, but are also linked to negative stereotypes towards minority groups. 
Recent empirical evidence–both in the international and in the Hungarian context–
underlined that asylum-seekers of Christian background are more welcomed compared 
to the ones with Muslim background (for international results see Hainmuller et al. 
(2016) and for Hungarian results see Boda and Simonovits 2016).
Hainmuller and Hopkins (2012) and Hainmuller et al. (2016) have recently 
devoted special attention to testing empirically how economic, humanitarian, and 
religious concerns affect attitudes towards asylum seekers and play a significant role 
in shaping respondents’ attitudes to asylum-seekers and migrants in the US and in 
certain European societies. Both pieces of research were based on a conjoint research 
design and tested for the influence of an extended list of randomized attributes of 
immigrants on generating support for admitting immigrants. Both results from the 
US and Europe demonstrate that host societies prefer immigrants of higher social 
4 The term was first used by Jørgen Goul Andersen and Tor Bjørklund in Denmark and Norway in the 1990s. 
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status (more highly educated immigrants in high-status jobs), while they view those 
who do not plan to work, have entered without authorization, or do not speak English, 
unfavourably. As far as the religion of the asylum seekers is concerned, a high level 
of anti-Muslim sentiment was measured (in comparison to Christians or Agnostic 
asylum seekers). Boda and Simonovits (2016) confirmed on Hungarian data that 
respondents tend to accept asylum seekers being persecuted due to belonging to a 
Christian denomination twice as likely as asylum seekers who were being persecuted 
due to belonging to a persecuted Islam sect (23% vs 9%).
Regarding the socio-economic predictors of perceived mass-migration related 
threat we could hardly find any research evidence, as this indicator is primarily used 
as a background variable in the analysis of prejudice. Therefore, we are presenting 
the results of the most recent empirical studies on anti-immigrant sentiments 
(with a special focus on the asylum seekers) as well as on the socio-demographic 
background of welfare chauvinism and general xenophobic attitudes instead.
Remarkably, both European and American preferences were rather similar 
across basic sociodemographic subgroups. According to Hainmuller et al (2016) 
respondents’ attitudes varied only little by age and social status (measured by labour 
market position, education level or income level). Political preferences, in contrast, 
played a more important role: left-wing party preferences were correlated positively 
with stronger humanitarian concerns and weaker anti-Muslim bias in all examined 
European countries (but not in the USA, where, somewhat strikingly, immigrants 
were assessed in similar ways by Democrats and Republicans). Cross-country 
comparison of the proportions of those who would accept asylum-seekers reveals 
that Hungary is among the most unaccepting countries (together with the Czech 
Republic, the UK and France), while Germany, Italy and Spain are at the other end of 
the refusal-acceptance scale.  
Focusing on the Hungarian research on xenophobia, descriptive analysis suggests 
that generally xenophobic attitudes are strongly correlated with social status and 
personal contact with immigrants. Respondents who are excluded from the labour 
market, have lower levels of education and are in a bad financial situation, as well 
those who do not know any immigrants personally, tend to demonstrate greater 
xenophobia (Dencső and Sik, 2007; Simonovits and Szalai 2013). Political activity 
and party preferences are also considered to be important predictors of xenophobic 
attitudes: Voters of the extreme right-wing party Jobbik and also politically inactive 
respondents (i.e. those not planning to participate in the next governmental election) 
tend to be more xenophobic than left-wing party supporters (Simonovits and Szalai 
2013). However, multivariate models also reveal that among the socio-demographic 
predictors included in the regression model (gender, age, place of residence and 
education level) only having a high level of education decreased significantly 
overtly xenophobic attitudes. Moreover, having personal contact with refugees and/
or asylum seekers was also partially negatively correlated to overt xenophobia in 
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2007 in Hungary (Dencső and Sik, 2007). Furthermore, multivariate models that 
examined a large Hungarian database from 2011 (N=3000) also underlined the 
fact that personal contact significantly decreased anti-immigrant sentiment as 
measured through perceived social distance (Simonovits and Szalai, 2012).
Freshly published research findings about anti-immigrant attitudes based on data 
from the European Social Survey reinforce the fact that the level of education and 
subjectively perceived financial status correlate negatively, while age correlates positively 
with dismissive attitudes towards immigrants. Party preference is also an important 
factor in anti-immigrant attitudes: being a Jobbik supporter significantly increases the 
likelihood of having a dismissive attitude (Messing, V. and Ságvári, B. 2016).
According to our latest research (implemented in late 2015), migration-related 
welfare chauvinism and scapegoating both seem to be predicted by a similar set 
of socio-demographic variables as the above mentioned indicators of xenophobia: 
party preferences and the level of education play an important role in all examined 
forms of xenophobic attitudes, including the level of fear and welfare chauvinism. 
Furthermore, personal contact with refugees, asylum seekers or migrants has 
a significant effect on the level of fear and welfare chauvinism, whereas gender 
and the subjectively perceived financial situation of the respondents do not play a 
significant role in these attitudes (Bernát et al. 2015). 
Research Hypotheses
Based on the review of the theoretical literature and the research evidence in 
previous sections we formulated four hypotheses for our research.
Scholars argue (Velasco Gonzalez et al., 2008) that it is worth differentiating 
between symbolic and realistic threats in relation to migration-related attitudes. 
The main idea of the concept of symbolic threat is that the out-group (in our case, 
migrants in Europe) has a different worldview that can be seen as threatening the 
cultural identity of the in-group (in this case, ‘European culture’). On the basis of 
this reasoning our first hypothesis is as follows:
H1: Even though there is a strong positive correlation between the perception of realistic 
and symbolic threats, these factors might be separable in people’ minds.
As far as the socio-economic background variables are concerned, educational 
attainment seems to be the most important predictor (among age, gender and place of 
residence), based on previous empirical studies. Low educational attainment has also 
been generally found to predict negative sentiments towards immigrants (Bizman 
and Yinon, 2001; Stephan and Stephan, 1996, for Hungarian results see: Messing and 
Ságvári, 2016., Dencső and Sik, 2007., and Sik, 2016). Therefore we might expect that 
respondents with higher educational levels would perceive less threat from immigrants. 
Bori Simonovits: Realistic and Symbolic Threats. The Social Basis of Mass-Migration... 59
H2: Among socio-demographic predictors educational attainment is the most important 
one. We expect a negative correlation between the level of education and the perceived 
level of threat. 
Interpersonal contact and communication with immigrant and/or minority groups 
has also been found to have negative affect with prejudice and threats (Bizman 
and Yinon, 2001; Gonzàlez et al., 2008; Stephan and Stephan, 1993, 1996; and for 
Hungarian research evidence see Dencső and Sik, 2007 and Simonovits and Szalai, 
2012). Therefore, we suppose that the more contacts between the majority society 
and the immigrants, the less likely they perceive threats. 
H3: There should be a negative correlation between the perceived threats (both realistic 
and symbolic) and interpersonal contact with immigrants. 
Furthermore, –as shown by previous empirical evidence– political activity and 
party preferences may also be important predictors of the perceived threats, (for 
international results see Hainmuller et al. 2016., and for Hungarian results see 
Simonovits and Szalai, 2013 and Messing-Ságvári, 2016). 
H4: Politically inactive respondents (operationalised as not planning to vote in the next 
election) are supposed to perceive higher levels of threats. Supporters of right wing 
parties might perceive higher levels of threats than left wingers.
Data and methods
According to our best knowledge, relatively little attention has been paid to examining 
attitudes to refugees and asylum seekers, but much more to attitudes towards migrants, 
even though these two groups raise different concerns, especially in today’s European 
context. The questions we used in our survey–carried out in Hungary in early 2016– 
addressed both groups, as the increased flow included various kinds of migrants, best 
labelled as a ‘mixed flow’ (see UNHCR’s definition of this term). 
The data analysed in this paper are derived from data collection carried out in 
mid-January 2016, two month after the Paris terror attack5 and right after the series 
of sexual assaults in several German cities on New Year’s Eve. Due to these dramatic 
events, we devoted a separate block of questions to migration-related threats in our 
survey. The survey block on migration-related attitudes–a part of TÁRKI’s regular 
Omnibus survey–was used on a sample of 1000 adult respondents; the weighted 
data represent the Hungarian adult population by age, level of education, place of 
residence and gender.
5 13 November 2015.
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In line with our first hypothesis, we aimed to distinguish between the two types 
of threats mentioned above by using a simple set of anxiety-related questions (as 
summarised in Table 1.):
(1) Realistic threat: we used two interrelated questions to measure the 
majority’s perceived anxiety related to the volume and ‘irregularity’ (i.e. 
undocumented status) of the current migration flow arriving to (i) Hungary 
and (ii) Europe. As these two components (volume and irregularity) were 
addressed in combination, their partial effects cannot be measured here.
 
(2) Symbolic threat: we also used two questions to assess perceived anxiety 
related to the different cultural and religious backgrounds of migrants 
arriving to (i) Hungary and (ii) Europe.
The set of questions analysed in this paper from the January 2016 survey is 
summarized below (Table 1). Responses in each case were coded on a four-point 
scale (agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, disagree).
Table 1: Elements of mass-migration-related threats
Realistic threats Symbolic threats
Seeing the great number of undocumented 
refugees and migrants entering Hungary without 
control makes me worried.
Seeing the arrival of refugees and migrants to 
Hungary of cultures and religions that are different 
from ours makes me worried.
Seeing the great number of undocumented 
refugees and migrants entering Europe without 
control makes me worried.
Seeing the arrival of refugees and migrants to 
Europe of cultures and religions that are different 
from ours makes me worried.
To investigate hypotheses 2,3 and 4 the following main explanatory variables are 
used in our multivariate analysis (categories of the variables are listed in brackets). 
Highest level of education attained has four categories: elementary school at 
most, vocational school, high school, college degree. As indicators of political 
attitudes we included political activity (would definitely vote at the next elections, 
probably would vote in the next election, probably would not vote in the next 
election, definitely would not vote in the next election) and party preference (only 
MSZP6, FIDESZ and Jobbik voters are included, due to the low number of cases for 
other parties). We identify those having interpersonal contact with immigrants 
as those who personally know foreigners living in Hungary (Chinese, Arab or African 
origin) and those who have met asylum-seekers, refugees or migrants in Hungary in 
the past 12 months (dichotomous variables).
6 MSZP is the acronym of Hungarian Socialist Party, FIDESZ is the right-wing party of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Jobbik is a 
radical nationalist party.
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Respondents’ age (measured in age-groups), gender, place of residence–measured by 
region and type of settlement–were used as control variables in order to cover the basic 
demographic characteristics of the respondents. Selected indicators of social capital 
were also included in our models as control variables, namely general trust (trusting 
people in general) and institutional trust (trusting the Hungarian police and religious 
organisations and churches7) 8. Finally, intention to emigrate9 and migration-related 
experience (having someone in the household who spent at least 12 months abroad in 
the past 10 years) were also included as control variables in our analysis.
Results 
How strong is the correlation between perceived realistic and symbolic threat?
Chart 1 indicates that (i) the level of perceived threat is very high in all areas 
measured, and (ii) that levels of fear are somewhat higher about the irregularity and 
volume of the current migration flow (realistic threat: 92-93%) than the level of fear 
related to the different cultural and religious background of the migrants (level of 
symbolic threat: 89-90%).
Chart 1 Different components of the perceived threat from the current migration flow into 
Europe and Hungary (in percent, cca. N=980) 
7 Frequency of visiting church was omitted as well, due to the strong correlation with trust in church.
8 ‘Trust the Hungarian government’ was eliminated from the explanatory variables due to the strong correlation of this variable 
with Fidesz voters. 
9 Two other indicators of migration potential (short-term and long-term migration potential) were both omitted from the 
model due to their strong correlation with each other, and with intention to emigrate.
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As the overwhelming majority of the respondents perceived high level of threat 
(both symbolic and realistic), we have checked whether these items measure similar 
social attitudes. In the next step we checked how these items are correlated in order 
to test our first hypothesis. The correlation matrix presented in the Appendix (Table 
A1) summarises the two-way correlations among the four anxiety items. First of all, 
it is obvious that there is a strong two-way correlation among all the components of 
mass-migration related anxiety that were examined. Secondly, and not surprisingly, 
we measured an even stronger correlation between items more closely connected 
with each other (differing only in their territorial dimension) compared to those that 
measure the different components of anxiety towards mass migration (indicated by 
dark shading in the correlation matrix).
Principal component analysis underlined that the two types of mass-migration-
related threats are strongly related (results are presented in the Appendix, Table A2.). 
To sum up, based on the correlation and principal component analysis, we can conclude 
that our first hypothesis was only partly confirmed by the data analysis, namely 
strong two-way correlations among all the components of mass-migration related 
anxiety were revealed. Moreover, as all the items showed high factor scores on a single 
principal component, with a very high explained variance (78%) we might conclude 
that these symbolic and realistic fears are seldom separable in people’s minds. Despite 
the high correlation between these items there are respondents who perceive different 
levels of realistic and symbolic threat. In order to identify individuals perceiving 
different types of threats a cross-tabulation of these variables is shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Possible combinations of perception of symbolic and realistic threat in relation to 
Hungary (N=982, total percentages)
 
Symbolic threats (different culture and religion) in relation to 
Hungary
Realistic threats (irregularity 
and volume) in relation to 
Hungary
disagree 
somewhat 
disagree
somewhat 
agree
strongly 
agree
total
disagree 1,3 0,1 0,1 0,0 1,5
somewhat disagree 0,5 2,6 1,2 0,3 4,7
somewhat agree 0,2 1,8 16,3 2,7 21,1
strongly agree 1,5 2,1 9,2 59,9 72,7
total 3,6 6,7 26,8 62,9 100,0
Table 2 summarises the possible combinations of symbolic and realistic threats 
perceived in relation to Hungary. Table 2 shows that most of the respondents think 
in a similar way concerning the perceived cultural and symbolic threats in relation 
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to Hungary (80% of the respondents can be found on the diagonal of the table). 
Among the rest of the respondents the majority is more afraid of the volume and 
irregularity of mass migration and less from the cultural aspect. Only a small 
group of respondents perceive stronger symbolic mass migration related threat 
than realistic threat. The same relationships are valid in the European context (see 
Table A3 in the Appendix). For our further analysis the following three types of 
respondents can be identified:
·	 Type 1: worried more about irregularity and volume than about the cultural or 
religious aspect of the current flow of mass migration related to Hungary (marked 
with dark grey in Table 2 and consisting of 15% of the total population).
·	 Type 2: worried more about the cultural or religious aspect than about the 
irregularity and volume of the current flow of mass migration related to Hungary 
(marked with light grey in Table 2 and consisting of 4% the total population). 
·	 Type 3 and Type 4: Worried about the irregularity and volume and the cultural or 
religious aspect of the current flow of mass migration to the same extent. These 
respondents can be found on the diagonal of Table 2 (marked with bold), consisting 
of 80% of the total population. The majority of this group (60% of all respondents) 
worry a lot about both the realistic and symbolic threat of migration related to 
Hungary- this subtype is called Type 4 (while the rest is Type 3).
As the number of respondents in Type 2 is not enough for multivariate analysis 
and people perceiving similar level of realistic and symbolic threat are considerably 
heterogeneous, we limit our further multivariate analysis to Type 1 and 4. 
The social basis of realistic and symbolic threats
Here we present results of multivariate models explaining the two interrelated 
components of mass-migration-related anxiety. The aim of constructing these 
models was to examine our second, third and fourth hypotheses–controlling for 
other predictors included in the models. As we already demonstrated that opinions 
about the impact of mass migration to Hungary and to Europe seem to be overlapping 
to a large extent, we focus our attention on the Hungarian context. The models on 
the European context are presented in the Appendix, in Table A4.
The two dichotomous dependent variables of our logistic regression models are:
·	 Stronger perception of realistic threat: 1– those who worry more strongly 
about the realistic threat than the symbolic threat of migration into Hungary 
(Type 1); 0– others.
·	  Perception of intense threat: 1– those who worry a lot both about the 
realistic and symbolic threat of migration into Hungary (Type 4); 0– others.
As far as the explanatory variables are concerned, we included the predictors 
mentioned above in our model, making sure that we did not include variables which 
are correlated to each other to a great extent (to avoid multicollinearity). We found 
that the predictors’ overall effect is higher in case of the model predicting intense 
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perception of threat (adjusted R-square are around 0,19) and somewhat lower in case 
of the model predicting perception of stronger realistic threat, which might partly 
be due to the different distribution of these indicators in the sample. The significant 
relationships that emerge from the multivariate models of threat are marked with 
bold in Table 3. The most important findings from these models are summarised 
below, reflecting on the hypotheses formulated above. 
Social demographic predictors
Contradicting our second hypothesis the level of education is not significantly related 
to mass-migration related anxiety. Significant relationship was found neither for 
the intensity nor for the type of perceived threat. Somewhat unexpectedly, being 
older–especially in certain age groups–decreases the probability of perceiving 
intense threats of the current flow of mass migration related both to Hungary and 
Europe. In contrast, age does not have a significant effect on perceiving stronger 
realistic than symbolic threat. In line with previous research evidence, gender does 
not have an impact on any of the examined threat variables.
Regional differences have a strong impact on both domains (Hungary and 
Europe) as regards extreme anxiety about the effect of mass migration: More 
precisely, compared to Central Hungary, being an inhabitant of Southern Trans-
Danubia or the Northern part of Hungary (Northern Hungary and Northern Great 
Plain) increases the likelihood of perceiving intense threat about the effects of mass 
migration to both Hungary and Europe. On the other hand, regional differences do 
not explain significantly the type of threat perceived, except for living in Southern 
Trans-Danubia, which decreases the likelihood of having stronger realistic than 
symbolic concerns related to migration to Hungary. Type of settlement did not 
explain any of the measured anxiety type.
Table 3 Multivariate models of threat related to Hungary: Types 1 and 4 - logistic regression 
models (N=830)
 
The perceived threat is rather 
realistic than symbolic 
Both realistic and symbolic 
threats are strongly perceived – 
  Odds ratio
Level of 
significance
Odds ratio
Level of 
significance
Level of education (reference: elementary school at most)
Vocational education 0,725 0,270 1,576 0,053
High school 0,692 0,227 1,272 0,327
College degree 0,995 0,988 0,684 0,180
Age group (reference: 18-27 years)
28-37 years old 1,348 0,415 0,531 0,035
38-47 years old 1,009 0,983 0,790 0,465
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The perceived threat is rather 
realistic than symbolic 
Both realistic and symbolic 
threats are strongly perceived – 
  Odds ratio
Level of 
significance
Odds ratio
Level of 
significance
48-57 years old 0,956 0,910 0,666 0,206
58-67 years old 0,928 0,853 0,512 0,038
68-77 years old 1,061 0,889 0,444 0,020
77 years old or older 1,378 0,629 0,301 0,029
Gender (female) 1,044 0,834 0,734 0,055
Region (reference: Central Hungary)
Central Trans-Danubia 0,549 0,153 1,687 0,125
Western Trans-Danubia 0,879 0,758 0,742 0,405
Southern Trans-Danubia 0,120 0,002 3,601 0,001
Northern Hungary 0,797 0,567 3,354 0,000
Northern Great Plain 0,766 0,501 1,941 0,044
Southern Great Plain 0,834 0,635 1,424 0,268
Type of settlement (reference: county seat)
City 0,884 0,689 0,916 0,727
Small settlement 0,858 0,635 1,329 0,274
Budapest 0,385 0,054 1,977 0,080
Party preference (reference: other)
Jobbik voters 0,457 0,025 1,739 0,041
FIDESZ voters 0,406 0,001 2,153 0,000
MSZP voters 0,666 0,315 0,525 0,047
Political activity (reference: would definitely vote in the next elections)
probably would vote 0,971 0,900 0,499 0,000
probably would not vote 0,422 0,091 0,951 0,880
definitely would not vote 0,72 0,280 1,366 0,213
Contact with migrants (dichotomous variables)
Personally knows foreigners 
living in Hungary (Chinese, Arab 
or African origin)
1,312 0,281 0,597 0,010
Has met asylum-seekers, 
refugees or migrants in Hungary 
in the past 12 months
0,501 0,010 2,989 0,000
Trust and migration experience (dichotomous variables)
Trust in people in general 1,03 0,893 1,167 0,380
Trust the churches/religious 
organisations
0,471 0,004 1,632 0,012
Trust the police 1,468 0,090 0,679 0,034
Does not intend to emigrate 0,61 0,275 0,872 0,676
Someone in household spent at 
least 12 months abroad in the 
past 10 years
1,631 0,153 1,269 0,426
Constant 0,644 0,483 0,995 0,992
Adjusted R-square 0,078 0, 190
Note: Significant relationships at p=0,05 level are marked bold.
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Migration-related experience and personal contact
As we have already argued (see Simonovits et al. 2016) personal contact seems 
to be a very important factor in understanding interaction between a minority 
and the majority population (see Allport 1954 on the original idea of Intergroup 
Contact Theory10, and a comprehensive review of more than 200 empirical studies 
examining contact hypothesis carried out by Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Many 
studies have found that intergroup contact decreases negative stereotyping, and 
scholars draw attention to the effect that the quantity of intergroup contact has on 
reducing prejudice. Frequency of contact helps to de-categorize out-group members 
and diminishes stereotypical ways of thinking (Velasco Gonzalez et al., 2008).
Using the survey instruments described earlier we measured whether respondents 
had come into contact with migrants in two ways. One instrument measures real personal 
relationship with immigrants (personally knowing a migrant who lives in Hungary), while 
the other instrument measures occasional contact. In line with what we had found in earlier 
studies (see Simonovits et al., 2016, Chapter 1.2 and 1.4), and similarly to the related literature 
already quoted, we found strong effects of contact with immigrants on mass-migration-
related anxiety. Moreover, we see the same tendency both in relation to migration to Europe 
and Hungary: the “quality type” of personal contact significantly decreases the chance of 
being extremely anxious, while having met some kind of migrant in the past 12 months 
increases the chance of being extremely anxious about both the realistic and the symbolic 
threats. As far as the type of perceived threat is concerned, only meeting asylum seekers has a 
significant effect: those who have met any kind of migrants in the past 12 months have lower 
chances of perceiving stronger realistic than symbolic threat in relation to Hungary.
Political preferences and anxiety
Political affiliation has a strong impact on attitudes toward mass migration related 
to Hungary. Being a potential supporter (voter) of a right-wing party (both FIDESZ 
and Jobbik) increases the likelihood of perceiving intense threats in relation to 
Hungary. FIDESZ sympathizers are also more likely to perceive intense threats in 
relation to Europe. Being a potential supporter (voter) of a left-wing party (MSZP) 
has a less pronounced but still significant impact: MSZP sympathizers are less likely 
to perceive intense threats related to mass migration to Hungary. Political preference 
also affects the type of threat perceived: right-wingers (both FIDESZ and Jobbik 
party supporters) are less likely to perceive stronger realistic threat than symbolic 
threat. Political activity predicts anxiety only weakly: those who would probably 
vote in the next elections are less likely to perceive intense threats compared to 
those who would definitely vote, but non-voters are not significantly different from 
those who would definitely vote. It has to be added, that non-voters did not differ 
significantly from voters in terms of the perceived type of anxiety either. 
10 The basic idea of Allport’s Intergroup Contact Theory is that, under appropriate conditions, interpersonal contact is one of the 
most effective ways of reducing prejudice between majority and minority group members.
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Among control variables we can see that the level of institutional trust 
affects mass-migration related anxiety, while general trust in people did not 
play a significant role in the models. The effect of institutional trust could be 
identified only in relation to Hungary, not in the European context. Trusting the 
church increases the likelihood of perceiving intense threats related to migration 
in Hungary. Trusting the church, however, decreases the chance of being more 
anxious about the realistic aspects of mass migration, both in relation to Hungary 
and Europe. Finally, migration related experience only affects the type of threat 
perceived in the European context. Respondents having a household member with 
migration experience (who spent at least 12 months abroad in the past 10 years) are 
more likely to perceive mass migration as a realistic rather than a symbolic threat.
Discussion and conclusion
Our research underlined that the different types of perceived threats connected to 
asylum-seekers and migrants are worth analysing in today’s Hungary, especially in the 
light of the recent terrorist attacks and other incidents. The findings of this study have 
confirmed to a large extent previous findings on anti-immigrant sentiments, but in 
case of certain socio-demographic predictors we found different results than expected. 
As far as our initial hypothesis (H1) is concerned we found a very strong positive 
correlation between realistic and symbolic threats, and we found that the majority 
of the respondents worry a lot about both the realistic and the symbolic threat of 
migration (around 59-60% of our sample). The research found the perceived level 
of threat to be equally and extremely high both in the European and the Hungarian 
context, with perceived levels of realistic threats somewhat higher than levels of 
symbolic threats. Principal component analysis also underlined that the two types 
of mass-migration-related threats are strongly related and are seldom separable in 
people’s minds. Based on the strongly interrelated indicators of symbolic and realistic 
threats we constructed four types of threat patterns, but due to limited number of 
cases we focused our multivariate analysis to understand the socio-demographic 
basis of two kinds of anxiety patterns: the perception of high levels of both symbolic 
and realistic threats and the perception of stronger realistic than symbolic threats. 
Regarding the second Hypothesis (H2) about the effect of socio-demographic 
predictors, data confirmed our expectations only partly. Especially, educational 
attainment and age worked differently than expected– highlighting that fear has 
different working mechanism than other aspects of anti-immigrant sentiments. 
On the one hand level of education did not have a statistically significant effect on 
any aspects of mass migration related threat. On the other hand, age also worked 
differently than expected, as according to our multivariate model, older age groups 
seemed to be less anxious than the youngest one, controlling for other factors. In line 
with earlier results, gender had no significant effects on the perceived level of threat.
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In case of our third hypothesis (H3) we found that interpersonal contacts 
worked as expected based on previous research evidence. Those who have had real 
personal contact with any kind of migrants seem to be less anxious about the cultural 
aspects of mass migration than about its irregularity and volume. Also in line with 
our previous research evidence on the same database (see Simonovits et al 2016) 
“superficial type” of contact (only seeing any types of migrants in Hungary) increases 
level of fear: those who have met any kind of refugees or migrant in the past 12 
months prior to the interview tend to perceive intense threats more likely compared 
to those who did not. Finally, political affiliation played an important role in the 
level of perceived threat, as it was expected based on international and national 
research evidence. Right wing voters re more likely to perceive intense threats 
compared to leftists. Political activity, on the other hand, did not have a clear effect 
on the perceived threats, in contrast to our fourth hypothesis (H4) about the effect 
of political activity. 
Trust in institutions affected perception of mass-migration related threats in 
a complex way. Whereas trusting churches increased the likelihood of perceiving 
intense threats concerning Hungary, trust in police had a negative effect on 
perceived threat. The former might be explained with the ambiguous role of the 
official Hungarian churches in the 2015 refugee crisis, while the latter one might be 
explained simply by trusting the police might decrease people’s migration-related 
fears, as the official communication was that “the razor wire fence and our strong 
police would be able to defend Hungary from the irregular migrants”. Overall, we 
might conclude that mass migration related fear (at least the ones we operationalised 
and measured by symbolic and realistic threats) work slightly differently from other 
indicators of anti-immigrant sentiments, most importantly xenophobia.
Finally, there are some limitations to our research. Most importantly it should 
be born in mind that in the analysed survey the perception of realistic and symbolic 
threat where only measured with one item. This seemed to be a problem especially 
in case of the realistic threat, where only anxiety about the volume and irregularity 
of mass-migration was assessed and the labour market aspects were left out. Based 
on the correlations presented, distinguishing Hungary and Europe did not make 
much sense, which suggests that in most of the cases this territorial aspect was 
not separated in respondents’ mind. However, comparing the multivariate models 
built separately for the Hungarian and the European contexts, we found certain 
differences in the effects of the explanatory variables. We might quote here the 
problem of relevance as well, as migration policy related questions are not that 
relevant to an average respondent in Hungary. Consequently respondents tend to 
form their opinions on the basis of their feelings without thinking through the 
different consequences of mass migration in the European and Hungarian context. 
Based on our findings, the perception of both symbolic and realistic threats were 
measured to be extremely high in contemporary Hungary and these perceptions of 
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threat may lead to negative prejudices towards ethnic minorities. Therefore, in the 
future, investigating the level and working mechanisms of the different aspects of 
threat perceptions would be crucial in the research of anti-immigrant sentiments. 
That is why, national governments and public speakers have a serious responsibility 
how migration-related news and information are contextualized and framed, as the 
moral panic may also have an effect on social norms; and as a result, of the moral 
panic such views may become incorporated into the beliefs of a society. 
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Appendix
Table A1. Pearson correlation coefficients of different aspects of fear (N= min 919) 
 
Perception of 
realistic 
threat- Hungary 
Perception of 
realistic 
threat- Europe
Perception of 
symbolic
 threat- Hungary 
Perception of 
symbolic 
threat- Europe 
Perception of realistic 
threat- Hungary 
1 ,806** ,640** ,626**
Perception of realistic 
threat- Europe
,806** 1 ,635** ,688**
Perception of symbolic 
threat- Hungary 
,640** ,635** 1 ,808**
Perception of symbolic 
threat- Europe
,626** ,688** ,808** 1
Note: Significant relationships are marked with * at p=0,05 level 
Table A2 Principal component analysis of realistic and symbolic threats (N=982) Explained 
variance= 77,7%
 Communalities Extraction
Realistic threat 1: anxiety related to the volume and irregularity (lack of documents) 
of the migration flow towards Hungary
0,765
Realistic threat 2: anxiety related to the volume and irregularity (lack of documents) 
of the migration flow towards Europe
0,790
Symbolic threat 1: anxiety related to the different cultural and religious background 
of migrants arriving in Hungary
0,764
Symbolic threat 2: anxiety related to the different cultural and religious background 
of migrants arriving in Europe
0,788
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
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Table A3: Possible combinations of symbolic and realistic threats perceived in relation to 
Europe (N=982, total percentages)
 
Symbolic threats (different culture and religion) in relation 
to Europe
Realistic threats (irregularity and 
volume) in relation to Europe
disagree 
somewhat 
disagree
somewhat 
agree
strongly 
agree
total
disagree 2 0 0 0 2
somewhat disagree 0 3 1 0 4
somewhat agree 0 2 18 3 23
strongly agree 1 2 8 59 71
total 3 7 27 62 100
Table A4 Multivariate models of threat related to Europe: Types 1 and 4 - logistic regression 
models (N=861)
 
The perceived threat is rather 
realistic than symbolic – 
Europe (Type 1) 
Both realistic and symbolic 
threats are strongly 
perceived –Europe (Type 4) 
  Odds ratio
Level of 
signifi-cance
Odds ratio
Level of 
signifi-cance
Level of education (reference: elementary school at most)
Vocational education 1,204 0,544 1,109 0,663
High school 0,918 0,794 1,022 0,931
College degree 1,334 0,419 0,603 0,077
Age group (reference: 18-27 years)
28-37 years old 1,178 0,670 0,323   0,000
38-47 years old 1,225 0,623 0,527    0,055
48-57 years old 1,012 0,977 0,435 0,012
58-67 years old 0,901 0,809 0,409 0,008
68-77 years old 1,601 0,282 0,296 0,001
77 years old or older 2,912 0,088 0,148 0,001
gender (female) 1,006 0,977 0,873 0,401
Region (reference: Central Hungary)
Central Trans-Danubia 0,693 0,390 1,615 0,160
Western Trans-Danubia 1,192 0,677 0,464 0,036
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The perceived threat is rather 
realistic than symbolic – 
Europe (Type 1) 
Both realistic and symbolic 
threats are strongly 
perceived –Europe (Type 4) 
  Odds ratio
Level of 
signifi-cance
Odds ratio
Level of 
signifi-cance
Southern Trans-Danubia 0,364 0,058 4,744 0,000
Northern Hungary 0,698 0,393 3,068 0,001
Northern Great Plain 0,623 0,261 1,869 0,059
Southern Great Plain 0,933 0,860 1,243 0,499
Type of settlement (reference: county seat)
City 1,001 0,998 0,821 0,436
Small settlement 0,635 0,169 1,493 0,133
Budapest 0,273 0,014 1,55 0,262
Party preference (reference: other)
Jobbik 1,034 0,921 1,659 0,063
FIDESZ 0,694 0,176 2,193 0,000
MSZP 1,131 0,762 0,67 0,217
Political activity (reference: would definitely vote in the next elections)
would probably vote in the next 
election
0,922 0,739 0,537 0,001
probably would not vote 0,996 0,992 0,826 0,575
definitely would not vote 0,858 0,637 1,088 0,738
Contact with migrants (dichotomous variables)
personally knows foreigners living 
in Hungary (Chinese, Arab or African 
origin)
0,953 0,857 0,555 0,003
has met refugees or migrants in 
Hungary in the past 12 months
0,695 0,179 3,102 0,000
Trust and migration experience (dichotomous variables)
Trust in people in general 1,814 0,008 1,06 0,742
Trust the church/religious 
organisations
0,481 0,005 1,266 0,228
Trust the police 1,513 0,084 0,809 0,248
Plan to emigrate in the next 12 
months
0,941 0,889 0,668 0,222
Someone in household spent at least 
12 months abroad in the past 10 years
2,005 0,034 1,213 0,520
Constant 0,204 0,016 1,888 0,225
Note: Significant relationships at p=0,05 level are marked bold.
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Abstract After the last EU enlargement state borders have been partially replaced by internal border 
controls of state bureaucracies to regulate westward migration. Existing ideas of threat associated with non-
EU migrants are accompanied by a ‘new menace’ referring to criminal ’insiders’ who might profit from the 
freedom of mobility within the EU. Accordingly, social security and immigration policies are increasingly 
intertwined within surveillance practices of member states, blurring the line between welfare and crime 
control measures. Therefore, new geopolitical measures and local risk management strategies are introduced 
for tracing and screening mobile groups. These monitoring practices are taking new forms in technocratic 
bureaucracies and are changing the means of interaction between newcomers and administrative bodies 
in host societies. In order to understand how these welfare service- based financial monitoring structures 
facilitate spatial population control, we need to understand how selective incentives are invented in order 
to make undesired groups voluntarily leave the executive territory of host societies. The long-standing 
prejudiced perception of newcomers as profiteers living on welfare, involved in illegal activities and unwilling 
to integrate has become a basis for Western concerns about a “threatening flood” of westward-bound benefit 
tourists. This has been used to justify new control measures in several Western member states. Based on 
empirical case studies, this study will analyse these asymmetries of surveillance within the virtual walls 
of Fortress Europe, and uncover coping of low-income migrants from Central and Eastern Europe in daily 
bureaucratic welfare procedures in London. 
Keywords: migration, welfare state, surveillance practices, benefit administration, coping strategies
Brave New Europe
Is the Brave New World coming of age? The growing popularity of dystopian literature 
raises the question whether Western surveillance societies are really moving toward 
Aldous Huxley’s (1932) World State, in which geopolitical aims are manifested in 
extended forms of monitoring that are supported by surveillance technologies that 
govern people on the move. In these surrealistic images of totalitarian control, 
minorities are defined as uncivilised, traditional and uneconomical, a threat to the 
happiness of the World Society who should be displaced into ‘savage reservations’. 
Following the idea of such dystopian social critiques, this study explores the 
